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The Rise of the Joint Stock Corporation: Towards Financialization or 
Socialization? 
Paddy Ireland, University of Bristol 
 
Economic Determinism and the De-Politicization of Corporate Governance 
The rise of the joint stock corporation has long been depicted as economically and 
technologically determined and not, therefore, much in need of explanation. It was, wrote 
BC Hunt in 1936, “the story of an economic necessity forcing its way slowly and painfully 
to legal recognition”.1 Or, as an international group of corporate law scholars recently put 
it: “the underlying uniformity of the corporate form” across jurisdictions is “induced by the 
economic exigencies of the large modern business enterprise”.2 Underlying this view is 
a particular account of history. It goes something like this. Individual proprietorships and 
“ordinary” partnerships based around a small number of people most of whom are 
actively involved in management are adequate at a certain level of technological 
development but become increasingly inadequate as technology advances. To gather 
together the resources required for large-scale, capital-intensive, technologically 
advanced industrial production, resort has to be had to the economic form of the joint 
stock company (JSC) which aggregates the money of large numbers of people, most of 
whom are inactive and uninvolved in management, and whose interest in the firm is 
purely financial. It follows that in many sectors JSCs are the “natural” organisational form 
for business and their rise to dominance technologically determined. So too, the 
argument runs, is the rise of the corporate legal form, for to facilitate the formation and 
operation of these JSCs an appropriate legal framework has to be provided. Ideally, 
JSCs need corporate legal status to give them a perpetual legal existence separate from 
that of their constantly changing memberships, and limited liability to attract the required 
amounts of capital from passive rentier investors who will not be actively involved in 
management.3 Recognising this, most states have enacted general incorporation 
statutes which make these legal privileges freely available. If they hadn’t, the argument 
runs, economic actors would have constructed a functional equivalent to the corporate 
                                                 
1 B C HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND (1936), 13. 
2 REINIER KRAAKMAN, PAUL DAVIES, HENRY HANSMANN, GERARD HERTIG, KLAUS HOPT, 
HIDEKI KANDA & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, 1, 215  (2004).  
3 The joint stock corporation is thus a combination of the joint stock company (JSC) economic form and 
corporate legal form. Legally, all firms that incorporate, whether large multinationals or small corner 
shops, are corporations, despite the often radical differences in their economic natures. In everyday 
usage, the term “corporation” tends to be used to refer to the large, public, incorporated joint stock 
companies that dominate contemporary economic life. This is how the term is used in this article. The 
economic and legal aspects of business organization are, of course, inextricably entwined: the economic 
nature of firms tends to be reflected in the legal arrangements between the members of the firm inter se, 
and between those members, the firm and outside third parties. These arrangements inevitably impact on 
the economic nature of the firms concerned. It is nevertheless analytically useful to distinguish the JSC as 
an economic form from the corporation as a legal form. Firstly, because, historically, many JSCs were 
unable to obtain corporate status and had to operate as unincorporated concerns. Originally, therefore, the 
term “JSC” referred not to the legal status of a firm but to its economic nature. And secondly, because in 
the business context the modern corporate legal form was designed with these JSCs in mind.  
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form through private action using property and contract.4 Contrary to appearances, 
therefore, the creation of an appropriate legal framework for JSCs is not reliant on the 
public sphere and on state-provided, legal interventions and privileges. States have 
simply provided, as a matter of convenience, the kind of legal framework that private 
contracting parties could and would have constructed anyway. These (implausible) 
claims, with their denial of the indispensability of public action, underlay the nexus-of-
contracts theories of the corporation which rose to prominence in the 1980s and 90s. 
These theories not only assert the fundamentally private and contractual nature of the 
corporation, but suggest that existing corporate structures and arrangements, being 
contract-and market-based, are a priori economically “efficient”.5 These efficiency claims 
have been reinforced by further claims about the market disciplines imposed on 
corporations and their managers by increasingly open, global financial markets and the 
existence of a “market for corporate control”. 
 
In this way it has come to be argued that it is not merely the triumph of the joint stock 
corporation but of the specifically shareholder-oriented joint stock corporation that is 
economically determined. Indeed, at the turn of the millennium Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman, two leading American corporate law scholars, announced “the end of 
history for corporate law”, arguing that, driven by global market forces, corporate law 
around the world was converging on a broadly uniform, Anglo-American, stock market-
based, shareholder-oriented legal model of the corporation. The historic dispute between 
those favouring this model and those favouring alternative, less shareholder-oriented 
models had, they argued, come conclusively to an end. In a world of increasingly open 
and global financial markets, shareholder-oriented “British and American firms” had out-
competed their less shareholder-oriented rivals, generating a growing normative 
consensus that “corporate managers should act exclusively in the economic interests of 
shareholders”. The “bulk of legal development worldwide” was thus towards a “standard” 
shareholder-oriented model of the corporation, a development to be welcomed as 
“enhanc[ing] the efficiency of corporate laws and practices”.6 There are, this argument 
runs, certain “basic legal characteristics” which, for reasons of “economic exigency”, 
“corporate law everywhere” has, “of necessity, [to] provide”: “legal personality, limited 
liability, transferable shares, delegated management …and investor ownership”, with the 
latter, of course, ensuring shareholder primacy.7 From this perspective, corporate 
                                                 
4 As was the case in the UK with so-called “deed of settlement” companies. On these, see RON 
HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844 (2000). 
5 See, for example, FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). For a critique of these theories, see Paddy Ireland, Defending the 
Rentier: Corporate Theory and the Re-Privatization of the Public Company, in JOHN PARKINSON ET 
AL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY (2001) 142. 
6 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEORGETOWN 
LAW JOURNAL 439-68 (2001) and The End of History for Corporate Law, Harvard Law School 
Discussion Paper No 280 (2000), Centre for Law, Economics and Business.  Hansmann and Kraakman 
describe the alternative models as manager-oriented, labour-oriented, state-oriented and stakeholder. 
7 KRAAKMAN ET AL, supra note 2, at 1, 215.  
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governance is a simple “agency problem”: how do you get manager-agents to act in the 
interests of their shareholder/investor-owner-principals?  
By asserting the fundamentally private, contractual, and market-based nature of 
corporations, these economically determinist accounts of historical development lend 
support not only to a pro-shareholder stance towards corporate governance, but to an 
approach which is supportive of voluntarism, private authority and (self-)regulation and 
hostile to public intervention.8 Equally importantly, these accounts serve to naturalise and 
de-politicise the corporate form as currently constituted and to entrench, as economic 
common-sense, a conception of the joint stock corporation as a “naturally” shareholder-
oriented, private enterprise. The effect is to place the corporate form largely beyond 
critical consideration and evaluation, let alone alteration.  
This article questions these accounts, arguing that hidden behind what is dressed up as 
economic necessity are interests and power; and that underlying the recent attempts to 
assert the fundamentally private nature of the corporation and corporate governance is 
growing shareholder dependence on the public realm. History shows, it argues, that the 
construction and survival of the corporate legal form as currently constituted has been 
driven as much by the political power of the rentier class as by technological necessity 
and economic efficiency. As many late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
commentators recognised, the rise of the joint stock corporation contained within it two 
very different possible futures reflecting the hybrid nature of JSC shareholding with its 
mixing of proprietary rights with creditors’ privileges: one of these futures was 
characterised by increasingly “financialized” production and corporations, the other by 
increasingly “socialized” production and corporations. Corporate governance has at 
different times headed in each direction: a period of financialization in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was followed in the mid-twentieth centry by a period of 
socialization, which has in turn been followed in recent decades by another period of 
intense financialization. These shifts of direction, the paper argues, were driven not by 
efficiency considerations but by changes in the balance of economic and political power. 
The recent re-theorizations of the corporation and corporate governance, it suggests, 
represent ideological attempts to legitimate the governance practices which have 
emerged in recent decades, with their renewed prioritization of the rentier interest, by “re-
privatizing” the corporation and corporate governance. This, the paper concludes is 
paradoxical given the ever shaper contradiction between the continuing private 
appropriation of corporate surpluses and growing emphasis and reliance on private 
regulatory authority, and the increasingly social (and transnational) character of 
production and increasing public interventions needed to protect rentier investors. In light 
of the economic and political problems that this “re-privatization” has brought, it suggests, 
we need to remind ourselves of the public foundations of private power and revisit the 
                                                 
8 One of the most visibleexamples of the increasingly importance of voluntarism and private forms of 
regulation is provided by the rise of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement.  
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question of whether it is appropriate to regard corporations as private enterprises rather 
than social institutions. 
The Joint Stock Company and the Corporate Legal Form 
To understand the historical twists and turns we need to focus as much on the economic, 
joint stock aspects of the joint stock corporation as on its legal ‘corporate’ aspects. We 
need, in other words, to keep reminding ourselves that public corporations are 
incorporated JSCs with very particular economic as well as legal characteristics. The 
distinguishing features of the JSC were identified by Adam Smith when he contrasted 
them with the “private co-partneries” that dominated productive activity at the time he 
was writing.9 The ideally-typical “private co-partnery” (or partnership) was based 
around a small number of closely-related individuals who were active participants in 
the firm. In law, this was reflected in the key principles of the law of partnership: mutual 
agency, joint asset ownership, and joint and several unlimited liability. These principles 
were considered to be consonant with the principles of morality and the market.10  
By contrast, the ideally-typical JSC centred on a capital fund rather than particular 
people; it had many more members, most of whom were inactive, their interest in the 
firm being largely, if not wholly, financial. JSC “proprietors”, Smith wrote, “seldom 
pretend to understand anything of the business of the company; … and give 
themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such half yearly dividend or 
yearly dividend as the directors think proper to make to them”.11 As this suggests, JSCs 
were vehicles not only for productive activity, but for passive rentier investment. It 
followed that they were characterised by a separation of ownership and management, 
and by (more or less) freely transferable shares. In Smith’s view, composed of inactive 
rentier shareholders and run by directors managing “other people’s money”, JSCs 
were inevitably characterised by “negligence and profusion”. This led him to conclude 
that although they needed state-granted privileges like corporate status and limited 
liability to function smoothly, these “exemptions from the general law” should be 
granted to JSCs only in special circumstances: where the capital required was beyond 
the capacity of a private partnership; where the risks were unusually great; where the 
operations of the business could be reduced to a routine; and where there was an 
identifiable public benefit.12 When JSCs did manage to acquire corporate privileges 
(which wasn’t easy), they acquired a quasi-public character and tended to be viewed 
“through the prism of the large state-favoured corporation” and to be “associated with 
privilege and monopoly, inefficiency and ‘Old Corruption’”.13 
                                                 
9 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776, Liberty Fund edition, 1982, by Campbell, Skinner & 
Todd), Volume II, 731-758. The section on JSCs originally appeared in the 3rd edition, published in 
1784. Smith seems to have drawn his picture of the JSC on the great trading companies.  
10 See, for example, JAMES TAYLOR, CREATING CAPITALISM (2006). 
11 SMITH, supra note 9, 741. 
12 SMITH, supra note 9, 757-58. By “general law” Smith seems to have meant the law of partnership 
with, inter alia, its joint and several unlimited liability. 
13 TAYLOR, supra note 10, 22. The same criticisms were made in the US: see Robert E Wright, Rise 
of the Corporation Nation, in DOUGLAS IRWIN & RICHARD SYLLA (eds), FOUNDING CHOICES: 
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Smith’s ideas about the JSC were highly influential and continued to shape state policy 
in the UK well into the nineteenth century as the number of firms with larger 
memberships, rentier investors and delegated management grew. Following his lead, 
corporate privileges were granted only sparingly, forcing many JSCs to operate as 
unincorporated concerns. By contrast, in the US, where capital was less abundant, 
states were much more willing to grant corporate privileges to encourage rentier 
investment and foster development.14 This underlay the terminological differences that 
emerged between the two jurisdictions. In late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
Britain, some newly formed JSCs were able to acquire corporate status but many were 
not. As a result, when Charles Wordsworth wrote the first book on “company law” in 1836 
- The Law Relating to Railway, Bank, Insurance, Mining and Other Joint Stock 
Companies, it was arranged around the economic organizational form of the JSC, 
encompassing unincorporated as well as incorporated JSCs.15 The term “company law” 
thus emerged as an abridgment of “JSC law”, meaning the law applicable to JSCs.16 By 
contrast, in the US, where corporate privileges became widely available much earlier 
and where all kinds of firms and associations acquired them, the equivalent text, 
Joseph Angell & Samuel Ames’, Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations 
Aggregate, published in 1832, was organized around the corporate legal form and did 
not draw a sharp line between business corporations and corporations of other sorts.17 
The UK terminology, however, reminds us of the crucial link between the joint stock 
company (JSC) as an economic form and the corporate legal form in the business 
                                                 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1790S (2011) 217. In the US, however, this seems to have 
served as a reason not for rationing the award of corporate privileges but for making them more freely 
available – by, for example, passing general incorporation statutes 
14 ROBERT E WRIGHT, CORPORATION NATION (2014). In the US the relative shortage of capital led 
to the incorporation of many more firms, and, very soon, to the enactment of general incorporation 
statutes which made corporate privileges freely available. 
 15 CHARLES WORDSWORTH, THE LAW RELATING TO RAILWAY, BANK INSURANCE, MINING AND 
OTHER JOINT STOCK COMPANIES (1ST ed., 1836; 2nd ed., 1837). References here are to the 2nd 
edition. At this time in the UK, corporate status and limited liability were obtainable only by Royal Charter 
or Special Act of Parliament. Legally speaking, JSCs which failed to acquire corporate status were mere 
(unincorporated) partnerships and (more or less) fully subject to the principles of the law of partnership, 
such as joint and several unlimited liability described in the text above. The JSCs operating in some of 
the sectors covered by Wordsworth (like railways) were usually incorporated; those operating in other 
sectors (like mining) were usually unincorporated. The distinctions between private partnerships and 
JSCs, and between incorporated and unincorporated JSCs was also drawn in the US: see JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (1841) 107-108. 
16 In the UK, the early (Joint Stock) Companies Acts were clearly aimed at JSCs, not ‘ordinary’ 
partnerships and for many years, pretty much only JSCs or JSC-like firms incorporated. Indeed, from 
their inception, JSCs were associated with corporate status and privileges, even if not all JSCs were able 
to secure them. In the mid-nineteenth century, when incorporation and limited liability were made freely 
available, the link became even stronger, for thereafter nearly all JSCs were legally obliged to 
incorporate. For some years, therefore, in the business context the JSC economic and corporate legal 
forms became more or less co-extensive. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century and the rise 
of the “private” company was this link broken. Thereafter, “company law” came to encompass not only 
JSCs but all legally incorporated firms, irrespective of their economic natures. 
17 JOSEPH ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
AGGREGATE (1ST ED., 1832). The introduction (v-vi) made it clear, however, that the growth of business 
corporations (private corporations) was one of the inspirations behind the book. 
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context: both company law and corporate law were essentially developed for 
application to JSCs (or JSC-like firms) with passive rentier investors, a separation of 
ownership and management, and so on.18 Neither was constructed with individual 
proprietorships, small partnerships or wholly-owned subsidiaries in mind. As a result 
understanding company/corporate law requires an understanding of the economic 
nature of the JSCs for which they were originally designed.  
 
The Joint Stock Company as a Type of Partnership 
In empirical reality in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the line 
between the private partnership and the JSC was fuzzy. In both the US and the UK, 
many firms emerged with large memberships, a separation of ownership and 
management, and (more or less) freely transferable shares. But many of these firms 
were more like extended partnerships than fully-fledged JSCs, their shareholders often 
participating in governance and having more than a purely financial interest in the 
enterprises concerned.19 Moreover, shares were not the liquid assets that they are 
today: restrictions on free transferability remained common and there were still no 
developed share markets.20 These material realities were reflected in the tendency, 
which continued well into the nineteenth century, to regard all JSCs (incorporated and 
unincorporated) as types of partnership.21 They were “public partnerships” – 
terminology which emphasized their quantitative rather than qualitative 
distinctiveness. It followed that in both jurisdictions JSCs tended to be seen as 
aggregations of individuals – as “theys” rather than “its”.22 Incorporated companies were 
simply the company’s members merged into one legally distinct entity: “a collection of 
                                                 
18 On the US, see Alfred Conard, Cook and the Corporate Shareholder: A Belated Review of William W 
Cook’s Publications on Corporations, 93 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW (1995) 1724.  
19 Many early JSC shareholders were local people investing to develop local infrastructures. See MARK 
FREEMAN, ROBIN PEARSON & JAMES TAYLOR, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACIES (2012); Eric 
Hilt, When Did Ownership Separate from Control? 68 J. ECON HIST (2008) 645. This was reflected, 
amongst other things, in the voting rights regimes adopted by companies at this time: see Henry 
Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights, 123 YALE LAW 
JOURNAL (2014) 948.  
20 See Paddy Ireland, Capitalism without the capitalist: The JSC Share and the Emergence of the 
Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality, 17 JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY (1996) 41. 
21 In the UK, for example, see the JSCs Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict., c.110), which refers to JSCs as types of 
partnership. In the US, see (inter alia) William Leggett, Joint Stock Partnership Law, EVENING POST 
30/12/1834; and JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (1841) 107-
108 (distinguishing “private partnerships” from “public companies” which could be incorporated or 
unincorporated, but referring to the latter as partnerships). In the US the comparatively late emergence 
of a developed share market – a major impediment to the development of large-scale pure rentier, 
money capitalist investment – contributed to the lingering conceptualization of corporations, even those 
organized on a joint stock basis, as types of partnership.  
 22 On the UK, see IRELAND, supra note 20. On the US, see EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN 
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 (1954) 66; Naomi Lamoreaux, ‘Partnerships, Corporations 
and the Limits on Contractual Freedom in US History’, in KENNETH PIPARTITO & DAVID SICILIA, 
CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA (2004) 29 at 44-45.   
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many individuals united into one body”, as Kyd put it.23 In similar vein, JSC shareholders 
were commonly seen and described as “partners”.  
This was reflected in Wordsworth’s book which depicted JSCs as large partnerships, and 
saw them all as, in principle, subject to the law of partnership, incorporated companies 
included, notwithstanding their “confirmation by public authority”.24 In common with his 
contemporaries, Wordsworth tended to see companies, like ordinary or private 
partnerships, as essentially contractual affairs irrespective of their legal status, treating 
Acts of Parliament, charters from the Crown, letters patent and other instruments of 
incorporation as akin to deeds of settlement - as simply one of the instruments by which 
“the partnership between directors and shareholders [wa]s constituted and governed”.25 
As this suggests, incorporation did not yet create an entity radically separate from its 
shareholders, nor provide anything resembling a fully-fledged alternative legal form for 
business enterprises.26 For Wordsworth, incorporation seems merely to have partially 
displaced the operation of the normal principles of partnership, the degree of 
displacement depending upon the precise terms of and privileges granted by the 
instrument of incorporation. Thus, Wordsworth presented the general principles of the 
law of partnership, highlighting “the rights of partners or shareholders in a company 
between themselves” and “the mutual rights of and liabilities of shareholders and third 
persons”, but noted the gradual emergence of rules specifically applicable to companies. 
He then sought to outline the derogations from these (partnership) principles in the 
companies (some incorporated, some unincorporated) to be found in different areas of 
productive activity, devoting separate chapters to railway, mining, banking, and 
insurance. He treated it as more or less axiomatic that joint stock companies, 
incorporated and unincorporated, were governed by the general law of partnership 
                                                 
 23 STEWART KYD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1793) Vol I, 1, 7. See also IRELAND, 
supra note 20. 
24 WORDSWORTH, supra note 15, 109. Some editions of Wordsworth’s book (the 3rd 1843 edition, for 
example) were reprinted and published in the US and cited in treatises such as Angell & Ames’.  
 25 At this time, instruments of incorporation were usually bespoke documents, those sponsoring the 
company commonly being intimately involved in the drafting process, statutory or otherwise. When 
questions arose about the impact of the special powers granted to companies (of compulsory purchase, 
for example) on third parties, the Acts of Parliament incorporating the companies concerned were regularly 
treated as containing a contract between the company and affected third parties. 
 26 As Samuel Williston observed, in relation to “the points which belong exclusively to the conception of 
the business corporation”, as opposed to the conception of corporations in general, “the law [was] formed 
very largely after 1800”: S Williston ` History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARVARD 
LAW REVIEW (1888) 105 at 113. As James Willard Hurst observed, “public policy had as yet drawn little 
distinction between governmental, eleemosynary, and business corporations”: THE LEGITIMACY OF 
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970) 7. Thus Blackstone’s 
coverage of corporations makes no reference to business enterprises. Before 1800, most corporations 
were municipalities, universities and the like, and the distinction between public and business corporations 
had not clearly been drawn. It is striking, for example, how marginal business corporations are to Kyd’s 
treatise; as Hurst says, he had “little to say, and scant authority to cite, concerning the use of the 
corporation for economic enterprise”: see KYD, supra note 27; Hurst ibid, 7.  
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except in those important respects in which the latter had been “superceded” (sic) or 
“limited and restrained”' either by the granting of corporate privileges or by the judiciary.27  
John William Smith adopted a very similar approach in his Compendium of Mercantile 
Law which appeared at around the same time. For Smith, a JSC was “a partnership 
consisting of a very large number of members” and the rights and liabilities of these 
members “would be precisely the same as those of any other sort of partner did not their 
multitude oblige them to adopt certain peculiar regulations for the government of the 
concern, which are ordinarily contained in an instrument called a deed of settlement to 
which is frequently added an act of parliament expressly for that purpose”. Where a 
company existed under such an act it “certainly differ[ed] ... from an ordinary firm” but 
only to the extent provided by the act or patent; in all other respects it was “governed by 
the ordinary law of partnership”. Joint stock companies were thus “nothing but 
partnerships of a peculiar kind” and the law relating to them could, therefore, be 
“conveniently be distributed under the same heads” as the law of partnership.28 
The Changing Nature of the JSC and JSC Shareholding 
If the US led the way in incorporations, Britain led the way in fully-fledged JSCs. The 
period from the 1830s saw the emergence of a growing number of ideally typical JSCs 
and a dramatic increase in the volume of out-and-out rentier shareholding. The driving 
force was the rise of railway companies which needed to raise enormous amounts of 
capital by contemporary standards – capital which in the UK was raised almost entirely 
privately through equity issues.29 The result was the appearance of JSCs populated by 
huge numbers of shareholders, most of whom were pure rentier “investors” whose 
interest in the firm was purely financial. This generated the emergence for the first time 
of a relatively well-developed public market for JSC shares.30 In the UK these changes 
in the character of the JSC and JSC shareholding prompted a series of changes to the 
law of partnership as it was applied to JSCs.31 In 1844, incorporation by mere 
                                                 
27 WORDSWORTH, supra note 18, 35, 64, 101-4. He adopted the same approach in the third edition of 
the book in 1842, modifying it only after the passing of the 1844 Act. It is, of course, worth noting that many 
of the JSCs that were granted corporate privileges by the state met Adam Smith’s “general utility” (public 
benefit) requirement.  
28 JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, COMPENDUIM OF MERCANTILE LAW (2nd ed., 1838) 57, 68; (3rd ed., 1843) 
62, 73. Multiple American editions of Smith’s book were published. Similar views are found in US cases 
such as Bissell v The Michigan Southern & Northern Indiana Railroad Cos (1860) 22 N.Y. 259 (New York 
Court of Appeals), where Comstock C.J. asserted that “a private or trading corporation is essentially a 
chartered partnership, with or without immunity from personal liability beyond the capital invested, and with 
certain other convenient attributes which ordinary partnerships do not enjoy”.  
29 On the different systems of railway finance, see Frank Dobbin, Why the Economy Reflects the Polity: 
Early Rail Policy in Britain, France and the United States, in GRANVETTER & SWEDBERG, THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC LIFE (2nd ed). It was the private, equity-based nature of UK railway 
finance that drove the faster development of the share market in the UK. Railroad finance in the US, for 
example, was much more debt-based and state supported.  
30 See IRELAND, supra note 20.    
31 By the closing decades of the century the law on JSCs, previously regarded as a branch of the law 
of partnership, had deviated so much from the principles of partnership that “company law” had come 
to be seen as an autonomous legal category in its own right: see Paddy Ireland, Property and Contract 
in Contemporary Corporate Theory, 23 LEGAL STUDIES (2003) 453. 
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registration was made available, followed in 1855 by the introduction of general limited 
liability. The effect of these legislative changes on the perceived nature of the 
incorporated JSC was considerable, for they turned what had once clearly been seen 
as legal privileges to be granted only where there were clear public benefits (such as 
developing the national economic infrastructure) into private rights.32 A series of 
judicial changes were also made to the law of partnership as it applied to JSCs: the 
partnership doctrine of mutual agency was abandoned, the doctrine of ultra vires was 
reformulated, and so on. The cumulative effect was to accommodate and offer 
protection to the growing (though still relatively small) class of rentier shareholders. In 
Robert Flannigan’s words, a “sustained effort” was made “to design ... arrangements 
that exposed passive investors to something less than the general liability of 
principals”.33  
Crucially, as part of these processes, JSC shares were judicially re-conceptualised as 
rights to profit - a new form of intangible personal property quite separate from the 
assets of the company. This was a very significant change. Originally, shares in all 
JSCs, incorporated and unincorporated, were regarded as equitable interests in the 
company’s assets and shareholders regarded, like partners, as having a direct 
proprietary interest in the firm’s property.34 In Bligh v Brent in 1837, however, the 
property of the shareholders was conceptualised as money not assets, and the 
shareholders portrayed, like creditors and unlike partners, as transferring ownership 
of this money to the company.35 The assets acquired by the company were then 
conceptualised as being owned, legally and equitably, by the company as a separate 
entity. Shareholders owned mere rights to “surplus profit” - personal property, 
irrespective of the nature of the company’s assets.36 The same reasoning was soon 
applied to shares and shareholding in unincorporated JSCs on the grounds that their 
economic natures were the same as in incorporated companies.37  
The effects were paradoxical. On the one hand, disconnected from assets, JSC shares 
began to look less like the rights in rem of partners – “insiders” who retain ownership 
                                                 
32 Significantly, the pressure for limited liability in the UK came much more from financial interests than 
from industry, which was generally opposed to its introduction: See Paddy Ireland, Limited Liability, 
Shareholder Rights and the Problem of Corporate Irresponsibility 34 CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS (2008) 837. 
33 Robert Flannigan, The Political Imposture of Passive Capital, 9 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW 
STUDIES (2009) 139 at 146-47.”The law of business corporations”, argue Kraakman et al, “is principally 
designed to facilitate the organization of investor-owned firms”; the governance structure of corporate 
law, which is aimed at dealing with “the basic agency problem between the firm’s owners and its 
managers … is designed principally to effectuate the interests of shareholders as a class”, supra note 
3, 33. 
34 Shares are, of course, still referred to as “equity”.  
35 This was crucial because it turned shareholders, at least in part, into lenders and, therefore, creditors, 
external to “the (asset-owning) company” – though, of course, they at the same time retained certain 
key proprietorial rights such as voting rights. 
36 Bligh v Brent (1837) 2 Y & C 268. In the 3rd edition of their treatise Angell & Ames opened the chapter 
on ‘the nature and transfer of stock in joint stock incorporated companies’ with an analysis of Bligh v 
Brent (1846, chapter XVI, 499). 
37 See IRELAND, supra note 20, 57-8.  
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of a firm’s assets and continue to carry the responsibilities and liabilities that go with 
this - and more like the rights in personam of creditors – “outsiders” who transfer 
ownership of their assets and cede responsibility and liability in return for regular 
money payments and a bundle of contractual rights.38 On the other hand, the 
disconnection of shares from assets (including any real estate owned by the 
company), together with the development of the market for shares, enhanced their 
transferability.39 The result was that that although they were now intangible and more 
contractual in nature, they had also become more exchangeable and more thing- and 
property-like. There were now two quite different bits of property: the assets owned by 
the company and the shares owned by the shareholders.40 This enabled JSCs, 
incorporated and unincorporated, to acquire, in a much fuller sense than before, an 
existence as asset-owning legal persons quite separate from that of their share-
owning shareholders.41 One manifestation of this was a subtle change in the wording 
of the UK Companies Acts. The Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 permitted seven or 
more persons to “form themselves” into an incorporated company, clearly implying that 
the company was made of them. By contrast, the Companies Act 1862 permitted 
seven or more persons to “form a company’” implying that the company was an object 
external to them, a “thing” made by, but not of, them.42 
The re-conceptualisation of the JSC share marked an important step in the processes 
whereby shareholders were conceptualised as (passive) “investors” rather than 
(active) “partners”. Although for many years policymakers nevertheless continued to 
assume (or hope) that shareholders would, at least to some extent, act like “owners” 
(rather than creditors) and monitor managers – a hope which persists to this day - 
gradually the rights and powers traditionally associated with ‘ownership’ were 
delegated to directors.43 Shareholders retained their residual control rights, however, 
                                                 
38 Relating mainly to dividends, winding up and voting. Like contractual rights, they are primarily 
determined by the terms of the share issue and by the company’s constitution, though some are 
conferred by statute: See Sarah Worthington, Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and 
Entitlements: Part 1, 22 COMPANY LAWYER (2001), 258. 
39  So too did the provisions of the 1844 Act, which declared shares of registered companies to be 
personal property and transferable as such. However, under the Act 1844 the liabilities of former 
shareholders did not terminate on transfer, continuing in certain circumstances for a further three years: 
see s66.  
40 No longer conceptualized as interests in the assets of the company but as revenue rights, shares 
became a form of what Marx called “fictitious capital”. 
 41 Some degree of separation of firms and their members had been made possible by the process of 
“affirmative asset partitioning” whereby the property of firms, whether corporations or partnerships, had 
come to be treated as constituting a separate estate shielded to some degree from the creditors of their 
members as individuals. The ability of firms to become separate entities even in this limited sense, 
however, was and is limited wherever the firm’s creditors are not confined to the members’ property but 
can go beyond it to reach the members themselves: see S J STOLJAR, GROUPS AND ENTITIES 
(1973), 79-87. 
42 See IRELAND, supra note 31. 
43 See FREEMAN ET AL, supra note 19, especially chaps 4 & 5; Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the 
Myth of Shareholder Ownership 62 MODERN LAW REVIEW (1999), 32. The Times picked up on this 
as early as 1840, remarking that companies had become “means of making money” not only “in 
idleness” but “in compulsory idleness”. Times 9/10/1840 
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so even if they couldn’t direct directors they could still dismiss them. They also, of 
course, now benefitted from the privilege of limited liability.44 The significance of this 
grew in the final decades of the century. Hitherto shares were generally of high 
denomination but only partly paid up. As a result, shareholders had residual liabilities 
to companies, albeit limited to any unpaid amounts on their shares (hence “limited 
liability”). The uncalled capital provided companies with a source of additional finance 
and acted as a comfort to creditors, but it also meant that links remained not only 
between shareholders and companies, but, indirectly, between shareholders and the 
company’s creditors: if a company’s assets were insufficient to meet the claims of 
creditors, the company could try to meet those claims by levying a call on its shares 
to recover any unpaid sums on those shares from shareholders. By the turn of the 
century, however, the links forged by these residual liabilities had all but been severed 
as share denominations fell and shares became fully paid-up, a process facilitated by 
the courts and legislature.45 By 1885 only about 32% of companies outside the 
banking, insurance and finance sectors had shares that weren’t fully paid up; by 1913 
this had fallen to just 5.4%.46 The result was that the de jure regime of limited liability 
became a de facto regime of no-liability. Shareholders really did now benefit from what 
Adam Smith had called a “total exemption from trouble and from risk”: all they stood 
to lose was the money spent on their shares.47 Indeed, by the 1870s wealthier 
shareholders were beginning to delegate not only management of companies but 
management of their money to institutions, diversifying their holdings and spreading 
their risks.48  
By eliminating the remaining liability links between companies and shareholders, the 
rise of the fully paid-up share paved the way for the emergence of the modern doctrine 
of separate corporate personality with its “complete separation” of companies and 
shareholders. Corporate shareholding had now come to comprise ownership of an 
unencumbered, free-standing right to revenue, entailing no responsibilities or 
liabilities, contractual or otherwise, to the company or third parties. Shareholders had, 
however, retained their residual control rights over this reified and de-personified legal 
entity, and this underpinned the emergence of the idea that the company/corporation 
                                                 
44 Although the 1844 JSCs Act placed management firmly in the hands of directors, the right of 
shareholders to elect directors was explicit: 7 & 8 Vict, c 110, s26. Significantly, the advocates of limited 
liability sought not general limited liability but the introduction of something resembling the French 
société en commandite, a limited partnership in which passivity was a pre-requisite of acquiring and 
retaining the privilege of limited liability.: see Francis Troubat, The Law of Commandatary and Limited 
Partnerships (Philadaelphia, Kay, 1853). For rentier investors in these firms, therefore, limited liability 
and control rights were decoupled. 
45 Legislatures took steps to facilitate capital reductions, and courts accepted ever more varied ways 
(other than handing over cash) of paying for shares.  
46 See Acheson, Turner & Ye, The character and denomination of shares in the Victorian equity market, 
65 ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW (2012) 862. Disappearing residual shareholder liabilities were 
attributable “mainly to demand-side pressures from investors”, the growing and increasingly prosperous 
middle classes demanding “safe equity”, and a “diversified portfolio of readily marketable stocks”.  
47 See IRELAND, supra note 32. 
48 See ARTHUR SCRATCHLEY, ON AVERAGE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (1875). 
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was an object of property that they “owned”.49 Shareholders had gone from being the 
company/corporation to owning it. They had become both “insiders” with residual 
proprietary rights able to elect and dismiss directors and insist that “the company” be 
run in their exclusive interests; and “outsiders” who, like creditors (and unlike partners), 
had transferred ownership of their property to a separate legal person and become 
responsibility- and liability-free. 50 
The peculiar nature of corporate shareholding is reflected in the difficulties lawyers 
have capturing the legal nature of the share. One of the most oft-cited definitions in the 
UK, that provided by Farwell J in Borland's Trustee v Steel Bros & Co Ltd, seeks to 
encompass both the proprietary and contractual dimensions of shares. According to 
Farwell, the share is “the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum 
of money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, but 
also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter 
se … [It] is an interest measured by a sum of money and made up of various rights 
contained in the contract, including the right to a sum of money of a more or less 
amount”.51 Some have used this to foreground the contractual dimensions (“liability”, 
“covenants”) of shares while noting their proprietary dimension (“interest”).52 Others, 
struggling with the same problem, have placed much greater emphasis on the 
proprietary qualities of shares.53 Ultimately though, as many commentators have 
recognized, the rigid theoretical separation between shareholders (with rights in the 
company as well as against it) and debenture-holders (with rights against the company 
but never in the company itself) collapses in contemporary economic reality.54 
Moreover, the JSC share’s mixing of insider and outsider rights, of proprietary rights 
with creditors privileges, lies at the heart of contemporary corporate dysfunctionality 
and irresponsibility, for it gives shareholders residual control rights which enable them 
to insist, as “owners”, on “shareholder value maximization” without having to worry 
about how the revenues and capital gains are generated, because, like creditors, they 
aren’t legally liable for corporate debts or wrongs. As Harry Glasbeek has observed, 
corporate shareholders “have little financial incentive to ensure that the managers 
involved behave legally, ethically, or decently’, because in law, they are ‘personally 
                                                 
49 This idea was strengthened by the retention by shareholders of the “residuary right in the things 
owned”, the possessor of which tends to be seen as the “owner”: see A M Honoré,  Ownership, in A G 
GUEST (ed), OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1961) 107. 
50 In Robert Flanagan’s words, shareholders had acquired a ”novel status”: Flannigan, Shareholder 
Fiduciary Accountability [2014] JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW, 1 at 6. 
51 [1901] 1 Ch 279 at 288. 
52 See, for example, ROBERT PENNINGTON, COMPANY LAW (7th ed., 1995), 56-57, 135-36; Robert 
Pennington, `Can Shares in Companies be Defined?' (1989) 10 COMPANY LAWYER 144.  
53 See, for example, L C B Gower, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW (4th ed 1979), 299-301, 
400.   
54See, for example, Gower, supra note 53, 299-301, 321; L.S. SEALY, CASES AND MATERIALS IN 
MODERN COMPANY LAW (6th ed 1996), 420-421. Legally, Robert Flannigan suggests, the debt-equity 
distinction is rooted in liability questions, though the “default financial position of shareholders is similar to 
that of debt holders: both have capped exposures that prevent recourse to other personal assets”: 
Flannigan, The Debt-Equity Distinction (2011) 26 BFLR, 451 at 454; Shareholder Fiduciary 
Accountability [2014] JBL, 1 at 10.   
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untouchable.”55 This has, of course, been only too evident in a range of recent 
corporate scandals and crises.  
 
The Joint Stock Company: Towards Financialization or Socialization? 
It was quickly recognized that the rise of the joint stock corporation was altering the 
nature of capitalism. However, commentators of various colours and persuasions 
detected in the ‘corporate revolution’ two very different possible futures. The first, 
rooted in the residual proprietary rights of shareholders, envisaged the emergence of 
increasingly “financialized” corporations and an increasingly “financialized” capitalism. 
The second, rooted in the increasingly creditor-like nature of shareholding and 
increasingly social character of production, envisaged increasingly “socialized” 
corporations and an increasingly “socialized” capitalism. These alternative visions 
have informed and shaped the debates about corporate governance and, indeed, have 
appeared at different times to be in the process of realization.  
Both, for example, figured in Marx’s analysis of the rise of the JSC. On the one hand, 
he saw it as a “progressive” development which marked the beginning of the 
supersession of the means of production as private property. The capital invested in 
JSCs, he argued, was “directly endowed with the form of social capital (capital of 
directly associated individuals) as distinct from private capital”. JSCs thus assumed 
“the form of social undertakings as distinct from private undertakings”; individual 
private property was being replaced by a kind of “socialized” property. Echoing Smith, 
Marx also observed that in JSCs the “actually functioning capitalist” was transformed 
into “a mere manager, administrator of other people’s capital”, while the “owner of 
capital” was transformed into “a mere money capitalist”. JSC shareholders received 
their reward in the form of interest, “that is, as mere compensation for owning capital 
that now is entirely divorced from function in the actual process of production”. 
Implicitly recognizing the diminution of the shareholder to something resembling a 
creditor, Marx argued that the rise of the JSC represented the “abolition of capital as 
private property within the framework of capitalist production itself”, the “latent abolition 
of capitalist property”; it entailed “private production without the control of private 
property”.56  
Although for Marx the rise of the JSC epitomized the increasingly socialized character 
of production, however, corporate surpluses continued to be appropriated privately. In 
his view, therefore, the JSC also highlighted the “contradiction between the general 
social power into which capital develops … and the private power of the individual 
capitalist”. Crucially, he argued, as management was handed over to “functionaries” 
and “owners” were rendered functionless, there was no reason why management 
functions couldn’t be delegated to workers. This led him explicitly to link the growing 
number of JSCs to the rise of the co-operative movement and to suggest that both 
                                                 
55 HARRY GLASBEEK, WEALTH BY STEALTH (2002), 129.  
56 KARL MARX, CAPITAL VOL III (1894, Lawrence & Wishart ed., 1959), 436-438.  
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were “transitional forms” in the shift from capitalism to socialism in which capital would 
be “reconverted” into the property of associated producers, “outright social property”.  
“The capitalist stock companies”, he wrote, “as much as the co-operative factories, 
should be considered as transitional forms from the capitalist mode of production to 
the associated one, with the only distinction that the antagonism is resolved negatively 
in the one and positively in the other”. For Marx, although “the antithesis between 
capital and labor” in co-operatives was only overcome “by way of making the 
associated laborers into their own capitalist, i.e. by making them use the means of 
production for the employment of their own labor”, they nevertheless showed “how a 
new mode of production naturally grows out of an old one”.57  
On the other hand, Marx recognized that one of the immediate effects of the 
development of the credit system had been to combine small amounts of money into 
large agglomerations of money concentrated in banks which acted as “the general 
managers of money-capital”, the “representatives of social capital”, of “capital in 
general”. This, he observed, had created a “money power”, a “financial oligarchy”, a 
“new financial aristocracy”. In the context of the JSC he went even further, arguing 
that its rise had generated “gambling on the stock exchange” and been accompanied 
by the development of a “whole system of swindling and cheating” in the shape of 
promoters, speculators and directors - a “new variety of parasites”, centring on 
“corporation promotion, stock issuance, and stock speculation”. Moreover, the 
“enormous centralization” of the credit system had given to “this class of parasites the 
fabulous power not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists, but also to 
interfere in production in a most dangerous manner”.58 For Marx, then, while the rise 
of the credit system and the joint stock corporation had set us on a road whose 
endpoint he expected to be “socialization”, the immediate effect had been productively 
dysfunctional “financialization”.  
Which, if either, of these two possible futures – one of increasing “financialization”, 
already visible and present; another of increasing “socialization”, present in a distorted 
form but as yet still largely latent – would materialize? Was the rise of the corporate 
economy paving the way for domination by a “new financial aristocracy” or, as Marx 
suggested, paving the way for a transition to socialism? Over the course of the next 
century and a half the double edged nature of the “corporate revolution” repeatedly 
surfaced, finding vivid expression in the debates about the nature of the corporation.  
Financialization in the Ascendancy 
In the decades after Marx’s death, the number of joint stock corporations grew, partly 
because of new technologies which demanded large-scale production but mainly 
because of the desire of firms to suppress destructive overproduction and price-cutting 
competition. The decades around the turn of the century saw the formation of 
numerous trusts (US), cartels (Germany) and Trade Associations (UK) aimed at fixing 
                                                 
57 MARX, supra note 56, 439-441 
58 MARX, supra note 56, 402-403; DAVID HARVEY, LIMITS TO CAPITAL (1982), 287. 
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prices and output. When these arrangements broke down, as they generally did, they 
were followed by mergers which created large industry-dominating joint stock 
corporations. By 1914, these corporations had come to dominate many key industries; 
in the inter-war years they came to dominate many more. The rise of the corporate 
economy was thus driven as much by market subversion as by market-driven 
economic “efficiency”.  
Financial institutions dominated many of the joint stock corporations which emerged, 
and by the turn of the century the growing power of “high finance” was clear for all to 
see, especially in the US and Germany, where large swathes of industry were under 
the control of banks and financiers. This was the period of “the first financial 
hegemony”.59 In the US financiers like J P Morgan led the way, using a mixture of 
voting trusts, debt and interlocking directorates to exercise de facto control over more 
and more corporations. Indeed, the growing domination of this plutocratic financial elite 
(the so-called “money trust”) prompted the Pujo Committee investigations of 1912-
13.60 In Germany banks led the way, prompting Rudolf Hilferding to develop his theory 
of “finance capital”. Elaborating and building upon Marx’s sketch of ‘the economics of 
the corporation’, Hilferding analyzed the implications of what he saw as the growing 
domination of German industry by a small number of banks and the fusion of industrial 
and financial capital. While recognizing the growing power and influence of high 
finance, however, Hilferding was one of a number of commentators who saw the rise 
of the JSC as helping to “socialize production”.61 Firstly, the sheer size and market 
power of these joint stock corporations endowed their activities, individually and 
collectively, with social significance, making it increasingly difficult to characterize 
them as purely “private” enterprises. Secondly, their rise was leading to production co-
ordinated more by corporate planning than free markets, a development which led 
later to the emergence of ideas about “organized” and “monopoly capitalism”.62 Finally, 
of course, the corporation had undermined traditional notions of private property in the 
productive sphere. The tangible productive assets of industry were now increasingly 
owned by separate corporate entities and managed by professional managers, with 
most shareholders reduced to the status of passive and functionless holders of income 
rights: shares, Hilferding wrote, represented a “creditor’s claims on future production”. 
The rise of the JSC and “finance capital”, he concluded, was establishing “socialize[d] 
production to the extent that this [was] possible under capitalism”. The problem was 
that the JSC and finance capital represented an “antagonistic” or “fraudulent form of 
socialization modified to suit the needs of capitalism”, in which “the control of social 
production remain[ed] vested in an oligarchy”. He nevertheless saw their rise as 
progressive, for it “facilitate[d] enormously the task of overcoming capitalism”: by 
                                                 
59 GERARD DUMENIL & DOMINQUE LEVY, THE CRISIS OF NEOLIBERALISM (2011) 
60 See also LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY (1912).  
61 RUDOLF HILFERDING, FINANCE CAPITAL (1909, Routledge edition, 2007). 
62 The term “organized capitalism” was first coined by Hilferding; the term “monopoly capitalism” is 
associated with the work of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy. For a brief discussion, see JOHN SCOTT, 
CORPORATE BUSINESS AND CAPITALIST CLASSES (OUP, 1997), 13-14, 24-25.  
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taking possession of six large Berlin banks you could take control of the most important 
spheres of industry. The key was “the struggle to dispossess this oligarchy”.63 
Although written in a different idiom, similar themes ran through the work of other 
commentators. For example, in Drift and Mastery, published in 1914, the American 
journalist Walter Lippmann argued that technological advances and the rise of the 
professionally managed corporation was “sucking the life out of private property”. 
Emphasizing the creditor-like nature of corporate shareholding, Lippmann argued that 
“the modern shareholder” was a “very feeble representative of the institution of private 
property”, having no productive role to play and no responsibilities to discharge: the 
“one qualification” was the “possession of some money and the desire for more”. 
Shares were now “little more than claims to residual profits”, and shareholders 
“transient” “absentee owners”, who flitted “like … butterfl[ies] from industry to industry” 
with their liquid, mobile capital. “Deprived of their property rights”, they were “being 
transformed into money lenders” with “a single motive” from whom it was unrealistic 
to expect a “high sense of social responsibility”. For Lippmann, however, socialization 
was already becoming a reality. There had, he argued, been a discernible “change in 
business motives” and a “revolution in business incentives”. Business and 
management were becoming “professions” akin to medicine, law and engineering in 
which “motives other than profit came into play”. It was true that “control ha[d] passed 
for the time being into the hands of investment experts, the banking interests”, but that 
control was already being challenged—not by the “decadent stockholders” but by 
“those most interested in the methods of industry: the consumer, the worker and the 
citizen at large”.64  
Not everyone was as confident. The American economist and sociologist Thorstein 
Veblen could see the progressive potential of the large corporation but was much less 
sure it would be realised. “Machine industry” and modern technology, he argued, 
demanded genuine “social ownership” and rendered the idea of individual property 
rights in the means of production hopelessly outdated. But while the rise of the joint 
stock corporation had facilitated large-scale production and the exploitation of the 
“industrial arts”, it had also seen “industry”, the technical processes concerned with 
the efficient production of useful goods, fall under the control of “business” – by which 
Veblen meant financial interests more concerned with making money than things. The 
result was that industrial processes were being managed not to maximize productive 
efficiency and output, but to secure pecuniary gains for the owners of financial 
property.65 “The financial community”, Veblen argued, had taken over ownership of 
the country’s largest corporations and thereby gained control of “the usufruct of [its] 
industrial system”.66 This operated against the best interests of the community which 
                                                 
63 HILFERDING SUPRA NOTE 61, 110, 367-8. In the 1920s, Hilferding served on the German 
“socialization” commission and developed a concept of what he called “organized capitalism”.  
64 WALTER LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY (1914, 1985 edition) 
65 THORSTEN VEBLEN, THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904), 77–8, 80. 
66 THORSTEN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP (1923), 231-2. 
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lay in the “efficient management” of industrial enterprises and “unhampered working 
out of the industrial system”.67 Indeed, financial domination often led to the 
“conscientious sabotage” of industry, with larger profits to be had from financial 
manipulation and the obstruction of production than from its facilitation. This led him 
to conclude that “business” had become a parasitic growth on industry and the 
investment bankers and corporate financiers had become restrictive of further 
economic development. Having little faith in class struggle as a way of realizing the 
possibilities inherent in modern industry and technology, Veblen struggled to see how 
these vested financial interests might be overcome.  
Towards Socialisation?  
By the late 1920s, however, Veblen’s pessimistic vision was beginning to seem at 
odds with the economic trajectory of American society. During the course of the 
decade, equity ownership by individuals increased and became more dispersed and 
the exercise of direct control by investment bank(er)s receded.68 “The great mass” of 
American industry, Robert S Brookings argued in 1925, had been “almost 
unconsciously converted from a management based on an intensely personal 
ownership to a management based on an ownership widely distributed and therefore 
almost entirely impersonal”.69 The small investor found it “practically impossible ... to 
keep in touch with, and exercise any intelligent control over, management”. At the 
same time, the direct forms of financial control exercised by Morgan and his like were 
gradually being replaced by more impersonal, bureaucratic forms of institutional share 
ownership. According to Veblen, this marked the emergence of a “new order” of 
“absentee ownership”.70 It also marked the beginning of a waning in financial power. 
Although investment banks continued to prosper, promoting mergers and 
combinations and using holding companies to carry pyramiding to new extremes, it 
was their “last hurrah”. The shattering effects of the crash and subsequent depression 
further weakened them. With corporate self-financing also increasing, there was a 
further shift of “bargaining strength … from the bankers in favor of the corporations”.71 
Management, the contemporary business commentator Mary Follett wrote, “not 
bankers, nor stockholders” was becoming “the fundamental element in industry”.72 The 
journalist Lincoln Steffens agreed, writing in 1931 that “financial sovereignty” was 
“passing from the banks to the management of industry—the management, not the 
                                                 
67 VEBLEN, supra n 65, 78; THORSTEN VEBLEN, THE VESTED INTERESTS AND THE COMMON 
MAN (1919), 93. 
68 William Z Ripley reported that there were only 4.4m shareholders in the US in 1900, but 14.4m by 
1923: RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927).  
69 ROBERT BROOKINGS, INDUSTRIAL OWNERSHIP: ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
SIGNIFICANCE (1925), viii. 
70 VEBLEN, supra note 66. 
71 Paul Sweezy, Investment Banking Revisited (1982), 33 MONTHLY REVIEW (no 10), 1 at 9. see also 
Sweezy, The Decline of the Investment Banker, ANTIOCH REVIEW, Spring 1941, reprinted in 
SWEEZY, THE PRESENT AS HISTORY (1953), 191 at 193. 
72 Mary Follett, How must business management develop in order to possess the fundamentals of a 
profession? in HENRY METCALF (ed), BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION (1927) 78. 
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ownership”.73 Berle and Means were, of course, shortly to add empirical weight to this 
idea.74  
As more and more commentators began to echo Lippmann’s claim that management 
was becoming a “profession”, the belief grew that corporations were being “socialized”. 
In Britain, by the mid-1920s Keynes was arguing that there was an inevitable tendency 
for “joint stock institutions, when they [had] reached a certain age and size, to 
approximate to the status of public corporations rather than that of individualistic 
private enterprise”. The “tendency of big enterprise to socialize itself”, he suggested, 
arose when “the owners of the capital, i.e. shareholders, are almost entirely 
disassociated from the management”. At this point managers became more concerned 
with stability and reputation than with profit maximization, and shareholders had to 
satisfy themselves with “conventionally adequate dividends”.75 In the US at around the 
same time, Robert Brookings similarly argued that while the “internal pressure from 
the stockholders [on managers] had decreased”, the “external pressures” on them 
from trades unions, politicians and the public had increased, creating new trends and 
objectives in corporate management. “The more completely management [was] 
separated from ownership”, he argued, “the more it comes to be regarded as the 
representative of all the cooperating parties and conflicting interests, and not simply 
of stockholders”. With stockholders “as a rule content with a reasonable return”, 
management was coming to “occupy the position of trustee”.76 These arguments were 
echoed by Merrick Dodd in his celebrated debate with Adolf Berle. Responding to 
Berle’s defense of shareholder primacy, Dodd observed that the great majority of the 
shareholders in large joint stock corporations were rentiers with little resemblance to 
traditional owners, and argued that corporations should be seen as social institutions 
rather than private enterprises, and directors required to take account of the interests 
not merely of shareholders but of employees, consumers, creditors and society as a 
whole. Indeed, Dodd argued, this was already happening. “Public opinion” was making 
“substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic 
institution which has a social service as well as profit-making function”. Corporate 
managers such as Owen D Young and Gerard Swope of the General Electric Company, 
he argued, recognized that managers were “no longer attorneys for stockholders” but 
“trustees of an institution” who owed obligations to employees, customers and the 
general public as well as to shareholders:  their job was “to administer wisely and fairly 
in the interest of all”. Dodd added that this “socialization” of the corporation was perfectly 
                                                 
73 LINCOLN STEFFENS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1931), 869.  
74 “The relative abundance of capital, coupled with the rise of new investment houses, the growth of 
direct investments, and the ability of large corporations to finance their own expansion from corporate 
surpluses, … undercut the finance capitalists, shifted power to a new managerial elite, and produced 
situations where the industrialist rather than the banker could call the tune”: ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW 
DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966), 305. 
75 J M KEYNES, END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE (1926) 
76 BROOKINGS, supra note 69, 21-25, 76. According to Brookings, stockholders were “as a rule content 
with a reasonable but reliable return”. 
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defensible if you took seriously the existence of the corporation as a genuinely 
separate legal person with interests of its own.77.  
Some were content to allow socialization to continue to develop informally within 
existing corporate legal structures. Thus Keynes, for example, dismissed the need for 
overt “socialization”, arguing that the nationalization of industries like the railways was 
unnecessary because “the battle of socialism against unlimited private profit [was] 
being won in detail hour by hour” from within these large enterprises.78 Others, 
however, wanted official recognition of the ways in which the growth in pure rentier 
share ownership had further blurred the lines between debt and property and between 
credit and capital, advocating the re-classification of shareholders as creditors 
(outsiders) who were “owed” but did not “own”. In his final book, Absentee Ownership, 
for example, Veblen openly questioned the remaining proprietary rights of 
shareholders. “Ownership” in the new corporate order, he argued, “no longer carrie[d] 
its earlier duties and responsibilities”, only certain “rights and immunities”, with the 
result that the classic liberal justifications for absolute property rights no longer applied. 
Corporate shareholders were “anonymous pensioners”, whose personal identities 
were irrelevant “even to the concern itself” and whose “sole effective relation to the 
enterprise [was] that of a fixed overhead charge on its operations”. They were the 
parasitic owners of rights to receive a “free income” drawn from “the… product of the 
underlying community” whose interests were conspiring against the full use of the 
‘industrial arts’.79  
In Britain, these sentiments found expression in the work of the Labour Party 
intellectuals, R H Tawney and Harold Laski. Tawney also castigated the inherently 
pernicious and parasitic nature of intangible financial property forms like the share80, 
arguing, like Veblen, that the traditional justifications for private property rights were 
inapplicable to property forms of this sort which divorced gain from service, and reward 
from work. Unlike rights to tangible personal possessions which were “indispensable 
to a life of decency and comfort” and encouraged industry and initiative, these new 
property forms were not only “functionless” but dysfunctional, directing productive 
activity towards “acquisition” rather than “service to society”. They dissipated creative 
energy, “corrupt[ed] the principle of industry”, and distorted productive activity. To 
redirect industry along more productively rational and socially beneficial paths, he too 
proposed that shareholders be re-classified as creditors and their rights attenuated to 
release industry from financial domination and enable it to be reorganized in more 
productively functional ways. Management should to be turned into a “profession” akin 
to medicine and law. Harold Laski reiterated these sentiments in A Grammar of 
Politics, recommending an “alteration of the character of the owner of wealth into a 
                                                 
77 See E Merrick Dodd, For whom are Corporate Managers Trustees? (1932) 45 HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW 1147. 
78 KEYNES, supra note 75. 
79 VEBLEN, supra note 67, 97–8, 105, 163-4 
80 R H TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY (1920).  
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person to whom a fixed dividend is paid” to enable production to be “infused … with 
the sense of responsibility it now lacks”.81  
Despite his disagreements with Dodd, Berle too recognized the changed nature of 
corporate shareholding. In the final section of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property Berle and Means argued that the modern corporation had “dissolved the 
[private] property atom” in which possession and control were united, and undermined 
the applicability of the “traditional logic” of profit and property. Corporations now involved 
two forms of property: one active, the tangible assets owned by the corporation and 
controlled by the managers; the other passive, the intangible revenue rights, “liquid, 
impersonal, and involving no responsibility”, owned by the shareholders. Reduced to a 
“mere recipient of the wages of capital”, the modern corporate shareholder now 
resembled “the bondholder or lender of money”. It followed that it was no longer 
appropriate to view shareholders as the “owners” of the corporation. The “corporate 
revolution”, they therefore concluded, had raised “legal, economic and social questions” 
of considerable importance, the “greatest” of which was “in whose interests should the 
great quasi-public corporations … be operated?” In the final chapter they outlined 
some possible answers, one of which involved developing an alternative conception of 
the corporation as a social institution. In becoming functionless rentiers, they argued, 
shareholders had “surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their 
sole interest” and “released the community from the obligation to protect them to the full 
extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights”. The community was now entitled 
“to demand that the modern corporation serve ... all society” and that various groups be 
“assign[ed] ... a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than 
private cupidity”; shareholders should get only “a fair return” on their capital.82 
 
Socialization in the Ascendancy: The Rise of Managerialism 
The decline in financial power did not prevent belief in the existence of an industry-
dominating “money trust” persisting into the 1930s.83 By the outbreak of the Second 
World War, however, it was clear that the direct domination of industrial capital by 
finance, which some had seen as a more or less permanent state of affairs, had, for 
the time being at least, waned. Indeed, in the decades after the War, the idea that 
ownership and control had been separated took hold and became the basis of 
“managerialist” theories not only of the corporation but of capitalism as a whole. Many 
thought that the rise of monopoly and oligopoly and replacement of market co-
ordination by planning, the weakening of high finance, disempowerment of rentier 
                                                 
81 HAROLD LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS (1925), 201–9.  
82 ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932), Book IV, chapter IV. A few years later, Joseph Schumoeter argued that with what 
he called the “evaporation of the substance of property” and the handing over of management power 
to professional managers, “the modern corporation, although the product of the capitalist process, 
socializes the bourgeois mind”, “relentlessly narrow[ing] the scope of capitalist motivation”: 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1943), 156. 
83 See, for example, WILLIAM DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE (1940). 
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shareholders, rise of professional managers, and, crucially, growing strength of 
organized labour was leading to more “socialized” corporations. Within a few years, 
some commentators were arguing that corporate management “no longer [saw itself as] 
the agent of proprietorship seeking to maximize return on investment”, but as 
“responsible to stockholders, employees, customers, the general public, and, perhaps, 
most important, the firm itself as an institution”.84 By the 1960's, it had become common, 
even in Britain, for the representatives of business “to declare that industry owes duties 
to employees, consumers and the nation as well as to shareholders”.85 In practice, if not 
in law, the corporate interest was becoming less closely identified with the shareholder 
interest, and corporate power, it seemed, was being exercised in a more socially 
sensitive and responsible manner.  
The claims of the managerialists did not go unchallenged, however. Broadly speaking, 
two different critiques emerged. The first accepted the decline in shareholder power 
but argued that managers were exercising their new found power and discretion in a 
self-interested way: the managerialism that had emerged was selfish and “sectional” 
rather than socialized and “non-sectional”.86 The second denied the loss of financial 
control, arguing that the level of shareholding required for effective strategic control by 
minorities was lower than often thought, and that control by minority financial interests 
was widespread: the dispersal of shareholdings had actually made it possible for 
minority interests, using intercorporate relations, interlocking directorships and the 
like, to wield disproportionate power.87 This led to attempts to distinguish “legal” or 
“nominal” ownership (which was dispersed) from “control” and “effective” ownership 
(which was concentrated).88  
The empirical research undertaken during this period, although yielding different 
results and conclusions, suggested that some of the more extreme claims of 
managerial autonomy were unsustainable. It is hard to deny, however, that corporate 
practices and behavior—and the social outcomes they generated—had changed. In 
general terms, and riding roughshod over the undoubted jurisdictional differences, 
Edward Herman probably got it about right when he argued that “management control” 
was a reality, but was “constrained”.89 Although one must be careful not to overstate, 
therefore, there is clear evidence that during this period corporate governance was 
more “socialized” than before or since. Indeed, it is not coincidental that the decline in 
shareholder power and more socialized corporate governance that marked the 
                                                 
84 Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW (1957), 313-4.  
85 Gower, supra Note 53, 578.   
86 See THEO NICHOLS, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND IDEOLOGY (1969). 
87 For a discussion of the literature, see LORRAINE TALBOT, CRITICAL COMPANY LAW (2008), 139-
145. 
88 Though there was little agreement about the proportion of shares needed to generate “control”: See 
SCOTT, supra note 62, 23, 30, 42-55. Strategic control was distinguished from operational control. On 
this, see Charles Bettelheim’s models of ownership: BETTELHEIM, ECONOMIC CALCULATION AND 
FORMS OF PROPERTY (1976). 
89 EDWARD HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER (1981). 
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“managerialist” era corresponded with a period in which the labour and trade union 
movements were relatively strong, and in which social democracy, the welfare state, 
and Keynesianism were enjoying their heyday. This was the 50 year or so period 
identified by Piketty and others as one in which income and wealth inequality 
narrowed. Nor is it insignificant that this was a period in which the existence of the 
corporation as legal persons radically separate from their shareholders was taken 
increasingly seriously—and not just for liability purposes. During this period the 
corporate interest really did come widely to be seen as something rather different from 
the interests of shareholders. 
Some continued to seek alterations to corporate structures, advocating the formal 
relegation of shareholders to the status of preferred creditors and dispersal of control 
rights among different groups such as employees.90 In light of what seemed like the 
gradual triumph of “socialization” in practice, however, others argued that as 
shareholders had been de facto disempowered there was no need for politically 
provocative nationalizations or attenuations of shareholder rights. They simply weren’t 
necessary. Socialization, it was believed, could be achieved without radical changes 
to the corporate legal form. Managers simply needed to be educated to act in a socially 
responsible manner. Indeed, many believed that a more socialized capitalism—what 
Berle called a “people’s capitalism”—was emerging. Some went still further, arguing 
that we were moving towards a post-capitalist society.91  
“Organised Money” and the Re-Privatization of the Corporation92 
As it turned out, they were mistaken. Although the key elements of the corporate legal 
form changed relatively little93, the decades since World War II saw the bundle of rights 
possessed by shareholders (and financial property owners in general) enhanced by, 
inter alia, the relaxation of the rules regulating the free movement of capital, 
modification of the rules on take-overs, and the emergence of new forms of investor 
protection. Shareholder power was further augmented by the diminishing power of 
organized labour and re-concentration of financial property ownership in institutions 
which themselves have a vested financial interest in maximizing shareholder returns. 
The latter has enabled shareholders, acting through their institutional representatives, 
to make better and more effective use of their residual proprietary rights to exert power 
in and over corporations and their managers. Moreover, the competition between 
                                                 
90 There was “no reason”, argued Bill Wedderburn, “not to equate [the shareholder’s] position with that 
of a well secured creditor”; the law should “not treat the shareholder as a ‘proprietor’ entitled to control”: 
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these institutions for investment funds has grown, as has the competition within them 
between portfolio managers subject to regular market-based performance evaluation. 
At the same time new kinds of financial institution have emerged – hedge funds, 
private equity firms and the like - that are more interested in quick capital gains than 
steady long-term revenue streams.94 The result has been not only an emphatic 
restoration of shareholder primacy - for managers the delivery of good shareholder 
returns has become an imperative - but the re-emergence of highly financialized forms 
of governance. Indeed, because of the mechanisms through which it operates, the 
exercise of financial power is more effective than it was a century ago. Today financial 
institutions exert power not only directly in individual companies but indirectly on the 
corporate sector as a whole through financial markets.95 The power exercised by 
rentiers has, in other words, become ubiquitous. Permanently under threat, directors 
have been placed under severe market pressure to maximize “shareholder value”, 
knowing that failure to meet the expectations of money managers and the growing 
army of security analysts renders them vulnerable to removal.  
The resulting managerial focus on share price has, of course, been encouraged and 
reinforced by new forms of executive remuneration involving share options and other 
performance-related bonuses. Aimed at re-aligning the financial interests of managers 
with those of shareholders, these forms of remuneration have made the ruthless 
pursuit of short-term shareholder value highly lucrative for executives: since the 1990s 
their pay has sky-rocketed. These developments have also transformed the image of 
the ideal executive “from one of a steady, reliable caretaker of the corporation and its 
many constituencies to that of a swashbuckling, iconoclastic champion of shareholder 
value” with little interest in the fate of other corporate “stakeholders”. With this the 
ideals of professionalism, established in American business schools in the 1920s to 
create “a managerial class that would run America’s large corporations in a way that 
served the broader interests of society rather than the narrowly defined ones of capital 
and labor”, have been swept away”.96  
Unsurprisingly, the main beneficiaries of these new forms of governance have been 
rentier shareholders. In the 1980s the share of national income accruing to financial 
institutions and rentier owners of financial property began to rise97 as corporations 
abandoned earlier policies of “retain and invest” in favor of policies of “downsize and 
distribute”.98 In the UK, for example, there was a marked upward shift in pay-outs from 
                                                 
94 On Private Equity, see EILEEN APPLEBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK 
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13-20% in the 1980s to 20-35% in the 1990s and 2000s.99 Further financial gains  have 
come in the form of higher share prices, with stock-market-focused managers 
engaging in downsizing, outsourcing, offshoring, share buy-backs and other forms of 
“financial re-engineering” to reduce costs (and wages), increase dividends and push 
up share values. The result has been the emergence of not merely shareholder-
oriented but highly financialized, short-termist forms of governance which show little 
concern for the long-term productive health of companies, let alone the interests of 
employees, communities, the environment, or society as a whole. Indeed, on 
occasions governance has descended into blatant looting and asset-stripping. The 
corporate legal form as currently constituted has made this resurgence of private 
power and these forms of governance possible, the residual proprietary rights attached 
to shares enabling the ruthless pursuit of financial gain without regard to, or any sense 
of responsibility for, either the long-term health of the firm of any “negative 
externalities”. The corporation’s financial performance may evidence shareholder 
value creation despite the fact that the firm may have destroyed value when these 
externalities are taken into account. Responsibility for dealing with any deleterious 
consequences (lost jobs, lower wages, damaged communities, growing inequality, 
environmental degradation, financial meltdowns and the like) has fallen on the state – 
states whose ability to raise taxes to deal with the fall-out of financialized governance 
has been undermined by the practices of those very same institutions and 
corporations. In recent decades, then, the governance of public corporations has been 
radically de-socialized, while the costs associated with financialized governance have 
been socialized. Moreover, this governance shift has not been confined to the US and 
the UK, and is now spreading to latecomers like Germany.100 Indeed, in recent years 
the OECD’s principles of corporate governance have sought to normalize and 
universalize an essentially Anglo-American, stock-market-based, shareholder-
oriented model of the corporation.101  
Re-Privatization: From Practice to Theory and Back to Practice 
The rise of these shareholder-oriented, financialized forms of governance has, of 
course, been controversial. Not only is there little evidence that they have made a 
positive contribution to investment or productive efficiency, they have been implicated 
in a string of corporate scandals and collapses as well as in rising inequality. Indeed, 
since the great financial crash even some erstwhile champions of “shareholder value” 
have questioned it as a goal.102 Despite this, new narratives have been developed 
justifying and, indeed, commending the reassertion of shareholder primacy. In other 
words, the re-privatization of the corporation and corporate surpluses in practice has 
been accompanied by attempts to re-privatize the corporation in theory.  
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The traditional justifications for shareholder primacy, of course, centre on the idea that 
corporations are “owned” by their shareholders and should, therefore, be run in the 
shareholder interest as a simple matter of private property right. In recent decades, 
however, the academic supporters of shareholder primacy have downplayed the 
“ownership” claims of shareholders, in recognition perhaps of their weakness103, and 
developed alternative, consequentialist justifications which centre on the claim that 
that shareholder primacy benefits society as a whole. This claim is rooted in the belief 
that despite the oligopolistic nature of many product markets and seemingly non-market 
nature of firms, the rise of increasingly open, global financial markets and emergence 
of a so-called “market for corporate control” has subjected corporations and corporate 
managers to market disciplines which, theoretically at least, place them back under the 
market.  
 
Indeed, as noted earlier, some have argued that globalization has brought different 
models of the corporation into competition with one another and the Anglo-American, 
shareholder-oriented, stock-market-based model is outcompeting its less shareholder-
oriented rivals.104 Others have gone still further. The so-called “nexus-of-contracts” 
theories of the corporation which began to emerge in the 1970s assert that existing 
(Anglo-American) corporate structures are themselves the products of private 
contracts. It follows that they are market-derived and, as such, a priori, “efficient”.105 
Empirically, these theories are implausible – the theorists involved have to engage in life-
threatening contortions to discover the required corporate "contracts" – but ideologically 
they do the trick.106 They dissolve the corporation out of existence, rendering corporate 
arrangements the alleged products of a series of atomised individual contracts and 
removing the the need to resort to claims about shareholder corporate “ownership”: the 
corporation is a mere “legal fiction”, a matter of “convenience rather than reality”, and 
no longer exists as an entity capable of being “owned”.107 With the corporation out of the 
way, shareholders are reconnected both to the corporate assets and to directors, 
rendering corporate governance a simple “agency problem”: how do you get director-
agents to act in the interests of their shareholder-principals? Having defined 
corporations out of existence, these theories also, of course, preclude consideration 
of their possible socialization. “An approach that emphasizes the contractual nature of 
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the corporation”, the leading contractual theorists Easterbrook and Fischel argue, 
“removes from the field of interesting questions one that plagued many writers: what is 
the goal of the corporation? Is it profit, and for whom? Social welfare more broadly 
defined? Is there anything wrong with corporate charity? Should corporations try to 
maximise profit over the long-run of the short-run? Our response to such questions is: 
who cares?”108 
By implicitly denying any necessary role for the state (and the public) in constructing 
corporate arrangements109 and by asserting the latter’s tendential efficiency, this 
marketized account of corporate structures not only serves to justify and legitimate the 
retention by shareholders of their residual income and exclusive control rights, it casts 
doubt on the wisdom of state interventions in corporate affairs. The result of these re-
theorizations is an approach to corporate governance which is hostile to public regulation 
and supportive of (and increasingly reliant on) voluntarism and private authority and 
regulation at both the national and international levels. This is reflected in the emergence 
and development of corporate governance principles and codes by private market 
actors both within specific jurisdictions and with international organizations. They have 
been issued by stock exchanges, corporations themselves, institutional investors, 
associations of directors and by international organizations, all with the support of 
governments.110  
The advocates of shareholder primacy have made further empirical claims in support 
of this re-privatization of the corporation. With the growth of private pensions, they 
argue, financial property ownership has been “democratized” so that more and more 
people directly benefit from the maximization of shareholder value: we’re all (more or 
less) shareholders now. The empirical findings of Piketty and other researchers, 
however, make it clear that despite the spread of financial property ownership, 
financial wealth remains very heavily concentrated amongst the wealthy and has 
become even more so in recent decades. Piketty, for example, shows that the 
concentration of capital and wealth ownership amongst both the top 10% and the top 
1% of the population has risen significantly since the 1970s and 80s. In the US the 
share of the top 10% rose from just over 60% to 72%, and the share of the top 1% 
from just below 30% to just over 35%. During the same period in the UK the wealth 
share of the top 10% rose from just over 60% to 70%, and the share of the top 1% 
from just over 20% to just under 30%. Edward Wolff paints a broadly similar picture in 
his analysis of the US Federal Reserve’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF), concluding that “in terms of wealth or income, substantial stock holdings have 
still not penetrated much beyond the reach of the rich and the upper middle class”.111 
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The findings of the 2013 Survey suggest that these trends have continued.112 The 
main beneficiaries of the re-privatization of the corporation have, then, been this elite 
group of rentiers, together with the executive class, and a range of financial 
intermediaries and functionaries who have benefitted from a financialized “economy 
of permanent restructuring”113 and from their role as the “agents of wealth defense” - 
the army of well-paid skilled professionals (lawyers, accountants and the like) who 
work to protect the property and incomes of the wealthy.114 Indeed, the rise of the 
shareholder value corporation has not only contributed to the growth in income and 
wealth inequality but welded these groups into a “new aristocracy of finance”.115  
Investor Protection and the Public Foundations of Private Power 
Nowhere has the growing economic and political power of this new financial oligarchy 
been clearer than in the prioritization of “investor protection” as a policy goal. 
Paradoxically, in a neoliberal world of increasingly globalized financial markets the 
achievement of this goal – including securing the continued private appropriation of 
corporate surpluses – is demanding ever more extensive public interventions. This is 
because of the very nature of financial property.   
As we have seen, extensive legal interventions were needed to constitute intangible 
property forms like shares as separate objects of property. This is because financial 
property is intangible: there is no tangible “thing” to which the property rights directly 
relate. The very object of property is a legal construct. This is most obvious with 
government bonds, but it is also true of JSC shares which no longer confer any direct 
proprietary interest in a company’s assets while the company is a going concern. 
Financial property is composed of rights to receive income streams - dividends, 
interest payments and the like. Crucially, extensive legal (and other) interventions are 
also needed to preserve the integrity of property of this sort, whose value is derived 
from expectations about the returns that will accrue to it in the future. Assessing the 
value of shares in particular inevitably involves some degree of speculation, for the 
returns to them are not specified in advance. Moreover, as we know only too well, 
expectations about future returns can be manipulated. Protecting the integrity of 
financial property thus requires a wide range of legal and other interventions to try to 
eliminate deceit and swindling, and to ensure that its market value reflects with 
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reasonable accuracy its future income-generating potential. This is reflected in the 
many and varied sources of the rules protecting investors found in company, security, 
bankruptcy, takeover and competition laws, as well as in stock exchange regulations 
and accounting standards.  
The vulnerability of intangible financial property extends beyond this, however. 
Because its value is derived from anticipated future revenues, financial property is 
potentially affected by any changes in the social processes through which the income 
streams are generated. The returns accruing to shares, for example, are potentially 
affected by everything from changes in labor and corporate laws to changes in health 
and safety regulations and trade and taxation policies; from changes in the balance of 
political and class power to changes in general economic conditions as well as in 
particular markets. Protecting their integrity and, indeed, that of financial property in 
general therefore requires measures aimed at creating and/or preserving the social 
conditions and practices responsible for ensuring a continuing flow of returns. In an 
era in which rentier investment has become an increasingly global affair, this is tricky, 
not least because there has emerged a growing conflict of interest between what 
Wolfgang Streeck has called the Staatsvolk – the general citizenry rooted in specific 
societies and voting in elections - and the Marktvolk – the footloose owners of liquid 
financial property operating in increasingly globalized financial markets and voting with 
their money. There is always a risk that the Staatsvolk, will make demands - like higher 
wages, improved labor and environmental standards, enhanced levels of social 
spending and so on - that threaten the interests of the Marktvolk, whose wealth and 
power depends (ironically) on the infrastructure provided by the state and taxes of the 
Staatsvolk..116 How have the Marktvolk dealt with these threats? 
In recent decades, the growing power of the Marktvolk has been reflected in the 
development of new techniques to protect investors from the political threats posed by 
democracy. An ensemble of rules aimed at offering quasi-constitutional protection to 
foreign investments have emerged. Actively promoted and developed by the leading 
OECD countries, this new “investment rules regime” is most clearly evident in the gradual 
emergence of a complex, transnational network of rules for the protection of foreign direct 
investment, embodied in a variety of legally binding agreements. The goal is to restrict 
the ability of states to adopt policies that threaten to diminish investors’ anticipated future 
returns without compensation by locking them into a “rule of investment law” which 
protects state action that might impair their investment interests.117 The rules constituting 
the regime are negotiated away from the public gaze by technocrats, often amidst 
intense corporate lobbying. One of the most important aspects to this regime is the way 
in which it seeks to compel states to provide compensation not only for the outright 
                                                 
116 STREECK, supra note 100. 
117 See DAVID SCHNEIDERMANN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION (2008), 
26; David Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy? Political Process and International Investment Law, 
60 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL (2010), 909; David Schneiderman, Investment Rules 
and the New Constitutionalism, 25 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY (2000), 757 at 772 
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physical expropriation (nationalization) of property but for the adoption of policies which 
have the effect of reducing the revenues likely to accrue in the future. So-called 
“regulatory takings” of this sort are regarded as tantamount to expropriation and widely 
seen as the most important part of the regime because of the restrictions they place on 
state policy. With third-party investors increasingly having standing to sue in domestic 
courts and international arbitration tribunals, states are now constrained not only by fears 
of capital flight but by the threat of litigation arising out of economic and social policies 
that negatively impact on future revenues. Since 2000, hundreds of foreign investors 
have sued states on this basis.118  
It is because of the extensive protections offered by this body of rules to property interests 
– and thus to private power - and its constraining effects on government policies that it 
has come to be described as representing a “new constitutionalism”. The aim is to 
establish rules which protect foreign investments and then to freeze them.119  In this way, 
states are bound into the future, “whatever political combinations develop at home to 
counteract it”. The “new constitutionalism” thus seeks to restrict the range of political 
possibility and insulate key aspects of economic life from democracy. The “states of 
advanced capitalism have to be constructed in such a way”, writes Streeck, “that they 
earn the enduring trust of the owners and movers of capital, by giving credible 
guarantees at the level of policy and institutions that they will not intervene in ‘the 
economy’—or that, if they do, it will only be to protect and enforce market justice in the 
shape of suitable returns on capital investments. A precondition of this is the 
neutralization of democracy …”120 In other areas, of course, this de-democratization 
has taken the form of the transfer of economic policy-making to “independent”, 
technocratic institutions such as central banks, international organizations (like the 
IMF) and summit meetings (like the European Council). 
Re-Politicizing Corporate Governance  
The legal form of the business corporation was constructed in the nineteenth century 
to facilitate the formation and operation of JSCs and to accommodate and protect the 
rentier investors that populated them. Originally, the “public” dimensions of corporate 
status and privileges – and, therefore, of incorporated JSCs - were clearly visible. In 
the early nineteenth century, writes James Taylor, “while it was recognized that 
corporations sanctioned by the state for public purposes should possess [legal] 
privileges, the idea that businessmen should have free access to these privileges for 
                                                 
118 These arrangements look likely soon to be joined by the controversial Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) currently being negotiated between the European Commission and the US 
government. TTIP, which seeks to eliminate the so-called “non-tariff barriers to trade” (most tariff barriers 
having already been negotiated away), would extend the regime still further, as the concept of “non-tariff 
barriers to trade” potentially encompasses everything from food standards to labor rights, and from safety 
regulations to environmental protection. 
119 The phrase was coined by Stephen Gill. See, for example: New Constitutionalism, Democratisation 
and Global Political Economy, 10 PACIFICA REVIEW (1998), 23.  
120 STREECK, supra n 100, 62. 
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private purposes seemed absurd to many commentators”.121 But with the enactment 
of general incorporation statutes, access to these privileges became a matter of 
private right and the public aspects of corporate legal status became increasingly 
invisible. The rise to dominance of the joint stock corporation in the late nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, however, marked the increasingly inter-connected and social 
nature of production under capitalism. It also radically changed the character of the 
dominant forms of capitalist property and, as history has shown, foreshadowed very 
different possible futures. Corporations and corporate governance have at different 
times and in different jurisdictions taken very different directions – directions 
determined less by economic and technological imperatives and more by economic 
and political power. Thus the radical re-privatization of the corporation which has taken 
place in recent decades has been underpinned by the declining power of labour and 
growing power of capital, particularly in its financial forms. Re-concentrated in financial 
institutions, corporate shareholders and their representatives have been able (and 
willing) to use their residual proprietary rights to shape corporate behaviour. They have 
also managed to entrench an ideology which supports shareholder primacy and the 
continued private appropriation of corporate surpluses. Given the inherently financial 
(and rentier) nature of shareholding in joint stock corporations, we should hardly be 
surprised that the result has been increasingly financialized forms of governance 
which are productively and socially dysfunctional. Nor should we be surprised that 
those who benefit from shareholder primacy continue to assert both the economic 
superiority of shareholder-orientated firms and the fundamentally private nature of 
these corporations and of production more generally – notwithstanding their obvious 
public and social dimensions, and the ever-growing dependence of rentier 
shareholders on state (public) interventions to protect their interests. What is surprising 
is that policy makers, in the teeth of the evidence, continue to seek solutions to the 
governance problems we so clearly face by encouraging business self-regulation and 
by further empowering shareholders.122  
 
The re-privatization of the public, joint stock corporation effected by the rise of 
impersonal, global financial markets is deeply paradoxical, for production has never 
been more international, social, and planned. A large proportion of international trade 
is now co-ordinated not by “the market” but by multi-national enterprises: it is trade 
internal to enterprises which takes place outside the market.123 Market mechanisms 
and disciplines are used selectively by capital to exert downward pressure on wages, 
taxes, labour and environmental standards and social provision, and to extract from 
governments policies congenial to the continuing private extraction of wealth. Indeed, 
                                                 
121 TAYLOR, supra note 10, 12. 
122 Jean-Phillipe Robe, ‘The Shareholder Rights Directive II: The Wrong Cure for a Deadly Disease’ 
123 Contracts are made between the various subsidiaries making up an enterprise and although, legally 
speaking, they involve distinct legal entities, in reality it is the same economic enterprise which is at 
both ends of the transaction. The prices paid, interest rates levied, and royalties agreed are governed 
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private appropriation on the current scale seems not only to require ever more public 
interventions (at the national and international levels) but to be incompatible with 
democracy. It might also prove to be self-undermining, threatening the very social 
conditions that make profit-making possible. The contradiction between ever more 
socialized and globalized production and continuing private appropriation has never 
been more acute. In this context, it is perhaps worth reminding ourselves of the way 
in which the US Supreme Court defined a “security” for the purposes of federal 
securities law. A financial instrument is a security, they held, if it “involves an 
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the 
efforts of others”.124 
 
                                                 
124 328 U.S. 293, per Murphy J. The case still represents the leading attempt by the US Supreme Court 
to define the nature of a security and was affirmed in United Housing Foundation Inc. v Forman, 421 
U.S. 837 (1975), and in Landreth Timber Co v Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).   
